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Political Islam:   from Transnational movement to Nationalism … and back 
Jocelyne Cesari, Georgetown University and Birmingham University 
Book Chapter for Liah Greenfeld edited volume, Globalization of 
Nationalism,  forthcoming at  ECPR press, 2016 
 
Browsing through the ever growing literature on political Islam at least since the 
1970s, we  see that the dominant apprehension is that political Islam and its synonymous 
Islamism are religiously based opposition movements  to secular states. 
This chapter challenges this dominant approach by arguing that political Islam is 
better understood as religious nationalism that can be traced back to the building of the 
nation-states on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It will also demonstrate how the 
global forms of radical Islam embodied today in groups like Al Qaida, Boko Haram or 
ISIS are the most recent iterations of political Islam that have shifted religious 
nationalism to religious transnationalism.  
As prompted by Fred Halliday (Nation and Religion, 2013, p.43 
nationalism refers to two distinct entities. First, it is a set of theories and ideologies 
forged by Enlightenment philosophers onward. Second, it is a series of investigation into 
concrete nation-building and identities that can take two opposite forms:  a perennial one 
(Hans Kohn and Hugh Seton-Watson) that states the primordial and unique features of a 
given national group across historical periods or a modernist (Anderson and Gellner)  in 
which nations  are seen  as the product of industrial society, history a resource by which 
elites can mobilize support.  
This duality translates into a schizophrenic body of literature with on one hand, 
theories and political philosophy loosely connected (if connected at all) to historical and 
sociological investigations of national identities across countries.  
 “What we need instead are comparative individual histories that are both written in the 
light of these general theories and which critically test them against the historical record.” 
HallidayP 83 
To do so we agree with scholars who do not consider nationalism an ideology, but rather  
an habitus, ie the sum of memories, emotions, values that align the cultural and political 
identity of people with a certain territory and institutions that control this territory. 
(Rokkan 1975).  
Therefore our goal is to shed light on the specifics of Muslim political cultures  by 
exploring the historicity  of political Islam and showing its enmeshment  with nation-
building. Nation-states emerge in Muslim lands on the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
They were the outcome of the importation of western concepts that can be dated back to 
the insertion of the Ottoman Empire into the Westphalian system of states.1 In the same 
vein, as shown by Vali Nasr or Bobby Said,2 the adoption of the Western concept of 
nation-State in Muslim-majority countries was the consequence not only of war or 
colonial power but also of the inclusion of Muslim polities into the international system. 
The outcomes of this adoption on the politicization of Islam have been much less 
examined. To do so, our study analyzes the diffusion of the Nation State concept and in 
the following, its embodiments in institutions and political practices.  
                                                
1	  Shmuel,	  Eisenstadt,	  The	  Great	  Revolutions	  and	  the	  Civilizations	  of	  Modernity,	  (Boston:	   Brill,	  2006).	  
Dominic	  Sachsenmaier,	  Jens	  Riedel,	  and	  Shmuel	  Eisentadt,	  Reflections	  on	  Multiple	  Modernities:	  European,	  
Chinese,	  and	  Other	  Interpretations,	  (Leiden:	  Koninklijke	  Brill,	  2001).	  Nissim	  Otmazgin	  and	  Eyal	  Ben-­‐Ari,	  
Popular	  Culture	  and	  the	  State	  in	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012). 
2	  See	  Bobby	  S.	  Said.	  A	  Fundamental	  Fear:	  Eurocentrism	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Islamism,	  Second	  Ed.,	  New	  
York,	  Palgrave,	  2003.	   
 At the core of Islam’s politicization lie the structural changes unleashed by the 
transition from pre-modern political entity to modern Nation-State. This transition led to 
the rise of authoritarian “promethean” regimes where State actors imposed upon their 
societies very invasive social and cultural transformations. The outcome has been the 
construction of strong monist national ideologies with Islam at their center. 
In this regard, an important aspect to consider is the role of the State. Thus, the 
use of Western terms or Western techniques or cultural styles should not trump us into 
thinking that some of these countries went through a differentiation between Islam and 
politics, as it was experienced in Western democracies. Actually, quite the opposite 
occurred. The use of Western secular techniques in law and the constitutions created a 
strong connection between Islam and politics, and contributed to redefine Islam as a 
political norm in ways unknown under the Muslim empires.3 My position then, is that the 
making of Islam as a modern religion, whereby norms, organizations and actors have 
been defined as Islamic, has been closely related to the making of the modern State.  
One of my major conclusions drawn from the data analysis that will be presented 
in this chapter is that modern religion in Muslim countries is positioned on the platform 
of the State. The institutionalization of religion occurs through the reconfiguration of 
relationships between people, property and organizations that were “religious” but 
                                                
3	  Specifically	  in	  the	  Turkish	  case,	  Hakan	  Yavuz	  explains,	  “As	  a	  result	  of	  nation-­‐building	  and	  militant	  
secularization,	  society	  came	  to	  be	  divided	  along	  the	  now	  familiar	  cleavages	  of	  Turkish	  versus	  Kurdish	  and	  
state	  versus	  society.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  caliphate,	  abolished	  in	  1924,	  had	  represented	  an	  Islamicly	  sanctioned	  
union	  of	  multiethnic	  groups	  and	  had	  recognized	  ethnic	  diversity	  without	  assigning	  it	  any	  political	  role.	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  caliphate	  was	  the	  symbol	  of	  a	  mutliethnic	  polity	  and	  authority;	  it	  symbolized	  the	  unity	  of	  
Muslims	  as	  a	  faith-­‐based	  community	  and	  allowed	  space	  for	  diverse	  loyalities	  and	  local	  autonomy	  for	  the	  
periphery.”	  
M.	  Hakan	  Yavuz,	  Islamic	  Political	  Identity	  in	  Turkey,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003,	  pp.	  52.	   
formerly outside the political control of the State apparatus.4 The State actions described 
in the following chapters highlight the efforts by the modern Nation-State to make Islam 
into both an organizational framework and ideology of practice.5  Modernity is thus not 
constituted by a one-sided State-driven project to discipline people’s thoughts, but 
“multiple projects or, rather a series of interlinked projects”6 whereby States and religions 
reshape each other and, in the process, redefine themselves. While this recalibration of 
religion by the modern State happened everywhere, in the West its outcome was 
autonomy of religious institutions from the State, whereas in most Muslim countries, the 
trajectory has been in the opposite direction. This counter-trajectory is a challenge for the 
dominant Western theories of secularization and democratization.  
The difference between the Western experience and the Muslim countries lies in 
the institutional arrangement of State-religion relations. In the West, secularism has 
translated into a legal order that preserves both the right to believe and to not believe, in 
essence defending their practical equality, even as the balance between competitive sets 
of beliefs is challenging to maintain, as illustrated by the claims of Christian 
fundamentalists or the European tensions around Islamic dress codes in public spaces. In 
Muslim countries on the other hand,  the building of the nation-state led to the fusion of 
Islam and political institutions, in ways that were unknown in the pre-modern era. As a 
consequence, the “secular age” came to be embodied in a ubiquitous hegemonic version 
of Islam,  even in countries considered secular like Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq  
which will serve as case studies in the analysis that unfolds. 
                                                
4	  Yoshiko	  Ashiwa	  and	  David	  L.	  Wank,	  	  Making	  religion,	  making	  the	  state:	  the	  politics	  of	  religion	  in	  modern	  
China,	  California,	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2009,	  pp.45.	  	   
5	  Ibid,	  pp.70.	   
6	  Ibid,	  pp.45.	   
 
Making the state, making the religion: 
Prior to the states, it is possible to detect the diffusion of western concepts of 
politics during the Ottoman Empire’s reign and amidst the rise of Western imperialism. 
The symbolic moment of this process was the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire within the 
Westphalian order under the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The treaty itself ended the Crimean 
War and was the first time the Ottoman Empire participated as “State” in the Westphalian 
order. Hence, it opened the possibility for non-European polities to be part of the 
international legal community and form alliances with the west.7 In the aftermath of this 
symbolic inclusion, three disparate factors contributed to the adoption of the Westphalian 
State system in the Middle East in the first half of the twentieth century: the fall of 
imperial governments in the region; the rise of local nationalist movements in urban 
centers such as Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, and Damascus; and the emergence of States with 
demarcated territorial boundaries that pursued self-interests and experienced hostile 
territorial disputes with neighboring States. Pro-western, liberal “civilizationalism” also 
became the dominant paradigm of the Ottoman modernists and reformists, despite strong 
internal resistance and protests against the imperialism of Western powers. This 
opposition was present because of the population’s objection to the western critique that 
the Caliphate was not “civilized” enough to gain the loyalty of its Christian subjects, 
which subsequently led to two different movements: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism.8  
Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were reactions to the rise of western liberalization 
                                                
7	  Michelle	  Burgis,	   “Faith	   in	   the	   State?	   Traditions	   of	   Territoriality	   and	   the	   Emergence	   of	  Modern	   Arab	  
Statehood,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  International	  Law,	  11	  (2009):	  40.	  
8	  Cemil	  Aydin,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Anti-­‐Westernism	  in	  Asia:	  Visions	  of	  World	  Order	  in	  Pan-­‐Islamic	  and	  Pan-­‐Asian	  
Thought,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  32.	   
rhetoric and imperialist threats in the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islamism was an intellectual 
and political movement that viewed the universal Islamic community (Ummah) as the 
ideal basis and source for modern political unity, in which the life and works of the 
Prophet Mohammed and his first four successors served as the model for such a political 
project. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, a western threat became more acute 
with the European incursions into Egypt and Tunisia in 1798 and 1881, respectively. 
These imperialist exploits greatly impacted 19th century reformers, such as Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciple, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who urged all 
Muslims to unite under al-Wahda al-Islamiyya (Muslim Unity) in the face of western 
imperialism in their journal al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond).9 The popularity of 
the Ottoman Caliphate also increased, as the Caliph was recognized as the head of the 
Muslim State on diplomatic par with the western powers.10 Accordingly, the Pan-Islamic 
ideology refashioned the concept of the Caliph, emphasizing his status as the Prophet 
Muhammad’s vice-regent, in order to buttress the Empire’s legitimacy in the international 
State system.  
Thus, in direct resistance to the international norm of the Nation-State, Pan-
Islamism became an ideological approach to the political community in the Ottoman 
lands, and the transnational vision of Pan-Islamic solidarity became a newly conceived 
geopolitical tool.11 For example, at the onset of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire 
increased efforts by initiating propaganda that utilized pan-Islamic ideas and fomented 
Muslim disobedience against the Western colonizers. 12 As a result of the establishment 
                                                
9	  Ibid,	  61. 
10	  Ibid,	  33. 
11	  Ibid,	  60. 
12	  Ibid,	  109-­‐110.	   
of Muslim States after the Second World War, “A rethinking of the feasibility of political 
pan-Islam gradually led to a search for alternative propositions, more acceptable to 
Muslim entities. The political goal of a unitary Islamic State was replaced by a goal of 
unity in Islamic policies.” 13 However, Pan-Islamism in the form of calls to recreate the 
Ummah by political leaders, activists, and Islamist ideologues was maintained, recreated, 
and gradually became associated with the increasingly fundamentalist Salafiyya 
movement. Additionally, it is important to note that even after World War I, Pan-
Islamism was not an ideology of indiscriminate hatred or rejection of the west. The 
reformulation of pan-Islamism as a categorically anti-western ideology happened after 
World War II and formed the basis for the anti-modernist and reactionary positions of 
future Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda. In this perspective, pansislamism shared with its 
secular counter parts of panarabism or nationalist movements, the idea that the West had 
to be emulated. The West politics or cultre was not “wrong” or bad, its domination was.  
Emerging at the same time as Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism was a political 
movement, which reached its height in the 1960s, and was centered on the idea that all 
Arab peoples, as a linguistic and cultural community, should unite under one banner. Its 
origins were in the al-Nahda cultural renaissance that took place during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries with the revival of Arabic poetry and literature and the rise of the 
print media.14This cultural “awakening”, as a rejection of western cultural norms, was 
partially a response to the western influence as described above. Politically, Pan-Arabism 
was first endorsed by Sharif Hussein bin Ali (1908-1917), the Sharif of Mecca, who 
wanted to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire. In espousing an Arabist political 
                                                
13	  Jacob	  M.	  Landau,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Pan-­‐Islam:	  Ideology	  and	  Organization,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1990),	  
249.	   
14	  Rashid	  Khalidi,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991. 
vision, he inspired the Arab Revolts of 1916. As the ideology of Arab nationalism gained 
popularity across the Middle Eastern province, and the British began to ally with the 
Arabs, the Ottoman Empire began to slowly crumble.15 Pan-Arabism inevitably competed 
with Pan-Islamist ideals, and from then on, political projects diverged between those 
based on the Ummah and those based on cultural and territorial nationalism.16 
As Acharya’s localization framework suggests, local actors in Muslim-majority 
countries resisted external (western) norms because of fears that these new norms could 
undermine existing beliefs and practices. As a result, both the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab 
movements came to shape resistance to foreign domination in all Muslim-majority 
countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, campaigns of resistance 
against the west framed and depicted European modernization, along with its nation-
building and secularization components, through the lens of Islamic terminology, and 
came in opposition with an essential Arab identity in the Middle East. 
A brief review of the resistance movements in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Turkey, and Tunisia illustrate this point. Egypt became the core location of the Salafiyya 
intellectual and political movement, which employs a revivified Islamic ethos as a major 
tool against western imperialism that would influence the whole Muslim world. 
Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), a disciple of the “father” of Pan-Islamism, al-Afghani, 
reinterpreted the basic principles of Islam in the light of modern reason.17 While arguing 
that Islamic principles were consistent with modern western rules of logic, Abduh 
simultaneously promoted an intellectual and cultural program to fight western 
                                                
15	  Mary	  C.	  Wilson,	  “The	  Hashemites,	  the	  Arab	  Revolt,	  and	  Arab	  Nationalism,”	  in	  Rashid	  Khalidi	  (eds.),	  The	  
Origins	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  204-­‐231. 
16	  John	  Willis,	   “Debating	   the	   Caliphate:	   Islam	   and	   Nation	   in	   the	  Work	   of	   Rashid	   Rida	   and	   Abul	   Kalam	  
Azad,”	  The	  International	  History	  Review,”	  32	  (2010):	  711.	   
17	  Christina	  Phelps	  Harris,	  Nationalism	  and	  Revolution	  in	  Egypt,	  (Stanford:	  Houton	  &	  Co,	  1964),	  116. 
imperialism, rather than a physical war. In 1905, one of Abduh’s followers, Shaykh 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), founder of the journal al-Manar, continued Abduh’s legacy, 
but added a more activist element.18  Reflecting on the “Golden Age” of Islam when the 
Caliphate was the sole spiritual and political authority for the entire Islamic community19 
and acknowledging that resurrecting such a Caliphate would be impossible given 
contemporary realities, Rida called instead for the unity of all Muslims under the 
leadership of a renewed Caliph. 
These ideas strongly influenced the activism of Hassan al Banna (1906-1949), the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. From its inception in 1928, the Brotherhood’s 
objective was to provide an Islamic alternative to the influence of western culture and 
politics. Al-Banna borrowed from Abduh and Rida the idea that Islam could be a tool of 
intellectual resistance to western culture and imperialism.20 At the time of its creation, the 
Brotherhood’s objectives competed with more secular nationalist agendas. This was 
especially true when, as a sign of King Faruq’s (1936-1952) Pan-Islamist ideals, an 
alliance between the monarchy and the Muslim Brotherhood took place in the 1940s to 
counter the nationalist and secular Wafd party.21   
However, the Muslim Brotherhood also went through several phases of conflict 
with various nationalist groups and leaders of the Nation-State over the course of the 
following decades. During and after World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood society 
created a private military apparatus to support the Arab revolts against the British 
colonial presence and allied with Germany, which led to accusations of disloyalty against 
                                                
18	  Ibid,	  130. 
19	  Dale	  Eickelman	  and	  James	  Piscatori.,	  Muslim	  Politics,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  31. 
20	  See	  Part	  Two,	  Chapter	  2	  for	  development	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  context.	   
21	  Richard	  Mitchell,	  The	  Society	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brothers,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  16. 
the Brotherhood by King Faruq. The conflicts with the State increasingly intensified 
under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) and his successors.22 
In Syria, the creation of the Ba’ath Party in 1956 was the direct outcome of the 
political influence of Pan-Arabism. At this time, this was the “creed of all political 
activists” in the region, and the founders of the Ba’ath Party, Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) 
and Salah Bitar (1912-1980), came to embody this broad-based territorial-nationalist 
movement and reiterated the threat of cultural and political westernization to the Pan-
Arab ideal. This political project led to tentative unifications such as the United Arab 
Republic (1958-1961) between Egypt and Syria. The positions of the early Ba’athist 
leaders with Islam were ambiguous. On the one hand, Aflaq was a secular Christian, but 
on the other hand, he considered Islam as an integral component of the Arab nation.23 As 
Aflaq envisioned it, Arabism was an ideology “whose Spirit is Islam.”24 Despite this 
inclusion of Islam in the Pan-Arabist ideals, the party’s political and governing structures 
were secular. 
Similarly, In Iraq, the Ba’ath Party gained power due to the widespread belief in 
Pan-Arab nationalism, in addition to popular resistance to foreign influences on the 
government and the strong desire to break the power of the oppressive, ruling elite.25 
Such circumstances eventually led to the rise of Saddam Hussein in 1979 as Head of 
State and the construction of Iraq as a unified Arab nation (see chapter three). As 
biographer Felicia Okeke-Ibezim describes, “Saddam [saw] himself as a proud Arab 
                                                
22	  See	  Part	  Two	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  Nasser,	  Sadat,	  and	  Mubarak.	   
23	  Liam	  Anderson	  and	  Gareth	  Stansfield,	  The	  Future	  of	   Iraq?:	  Dictatorship,	  Democracy,	  or	  Division,	   (New	  
York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2004),	  66. 
24	  Ibid,	  66. 
25	  John	  F.	  Devlin,	  “The	  Baath	  Party:	  Rise	  and	  Metamorphosis”,	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  96	  (1991):	  
1404. 
nationalist… the defender of Holy Islam…[and] a valiant knight leading the Arabs into a 
battle against the infidel.”26 Thus, Saddam implemented policies that emphasized Arab 
unity, such as his Arab National Charter in 1980, to increase co-operation towards 
common goals in the Arab world. Further, with the change of governance in nearby Iran 
in 1979 and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Ba’ath Party agenda faced 
competition from the Pan-Islamist agenda of the Iranian Islamic Republic. As a result, 
Saddam’s agenda increasingly downplayed Islamic identities in order to foster a 
nationalism that distinguished Arab Iraq from its neighboring Islamic republic in Iran.  
The creation of Pakistan, in contrast, is based on the idea of a political refuge for 
Muslims, but Pan-Islamism was not the main source of inspiration for the partitioning of 
the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, prior to the movement for independence from the 
British-ruled India, several pan-Islamist movements, led by poet-philosopher Mohammad 
Iqbal (1877-1938) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), gained significant support in 
India. First, Sayyid Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi (1856-1921) created a populist Islamic 
revivalist movement in the late 1800s. Formally termed the Ahl e Sunnat wa Jama’at, this 
movement had both Sunni and Sufi origins, and it was known for its more “liberal” 
perspective on Islam in the sense that it upheld the idea of intercession between the 
Divine and humans against the more puritan Wahabis and Deobandis groups.27 This 
revivalist trend was followed by the pro-Ottoman Khilafat movement, led by Maulana 
Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) and Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), which declared the 
allegiance of Indian Muslims to the Ottomans during a conference held in Karachi in July 
                                                
26	  Felicia	  Okeke-­‐Ibezim,	  Saddam	  Hussein:	  The	  Legendary	  Dictator,	  (New	  York:	  Ekwike,	  	  2006),	  9. 
27	  Kemal	   Karpat,	  The	   Politicization	   of	   Islam:	   Reconstructing	   Identity,	   State,	   Faith,	   and	  Community	   in	   the	  
Late	  Ottoman	  State,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  46.	   
1921.28 However, when Kamal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate in 1924, the Khilafat 
movement quickly lost momentum in India.  
These Pan-Islamist movements set the stage for Iqbal and Jinnah to encourage and 
promote the existence of a Muslim nation set apart from the hegemony of India’s Hindu 
majority. Iqbal proposed a separate Muslim State in 1930 as the highest ideal and course 
of action.29 Later, Jinnah adopted and promoted this idea with the creation of the Muslim 
League. Correspondence between Iqbal and Jinnah reveals that they thought that only a 
two-State system could liberate Muslims from non-Muslim majority.30 In a speech to the 
Punjab Muslim Students Association in March 1944, Jinnah strongly promoted the 
creation of Pakistan as an implementation of Muslim ideals.  
 Turkey offers a different case of norm diffusion because the nation-building 
project was the direct outcome of tensions and conflicts within the Ottoman Empire 
around Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabist trends. The last Ottoman Sultans, such as 
Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), used Pan-Islamic ideas to promote imperial unity and 
maintain their control over different parts of the Empire that had been penetrated by 
western political ideas.31 As Kemal Karpat suggests, “religious” activities were used to 
“nationalize” the millets32 of the Ottoman dynasty.33 Abdulhamid repaired holy sites in 
Mecca, Medina, and Karbala, renovated mosques and schools throughout the empire, and 
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33	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gave priority to the printing and distribution of the Qur’an to his subjects.34 These 
activities reinforced his position as the Caliph in the eyes of subjects for whom Islam was 
a significant marker of identity.  
In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk movement (beginning 
in 1908) emerged as an alternative political project to the reinforcement of the Caliphate. 
Young Turk Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) was known for his attempts to reconcile Islam with 
western ideas. As suggested by Umat Azak, Riza’s project was an “anti-clerical struggle 
to refashion Islam as a private matter and as a rational belief comparable with 
modernization.”35 In other words, the Young Turk movement was not necessarily anti-
Islam but fought against the Caliphate’s version of the religion-State relationship. 
Confronted with independence movements (Armenian, Greek, etc.) sprouting throughout 
the Empire, the Young Turks emphasized their own “Turkishness”, spread the idea of a 
Turkish nation, and promoted a local form of Islam where prayers and sermons would be 
performed in the Turkish language.36  With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end 
of World War I, the nationalist movement took complete ascendancy in the former 
provinces of the empire and led to the creation of modern Turkey.  
In Tunisia, allegiance to the Ummah was manifested in a pervasive loyalty to the 
Caliphate as a way to resist reforms initiated by the modernist elite under French 
influence, such as Mohammad as-Sadiq Bey (1859-1881). From 1864 until 1881, after 
France became the official protector of the country with the Treaty of Bardo, Pan-Islamist 
ideals induced continuous unrest against the urban Westernized elites that asserted their 
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supremacy.37 Subsequently, in the wake of the First World War, the sense of trans-
continental Islamic belonging, stemming from solidarity with the Ottomans, persisted 
with the formation of the Destour Party in 1920. The leader of the party, Sheikh 
Abdelaziz Taalbi (1920-1934), spoke little French and was a student of the Salafiyya 
movement.38 The party’s membership drew from the educated elite who were fluent in 
Islamic and Arabic cultures (in contrast to the elite that drew its references from the 
west). Although it ultimately accepted the existence of the French Protectorate, the party 
elite viewed European influences as obstacles to a Muslim renaissance.  
Destour was the predecessor to the Neo-Destour Party that arose in 1934 and 
spearheaded the nationalist movement under Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987). With the 
formation of the Neo-Destour Party, many of the Islamic connections to nationalism were 
minimized and thus began to fade. However, although Bourguiba would later be known 
for his secular orientation and his dismantling of Islamic institutions and political 
neutralization of the ulama during the anticolonial movement, he was often referred to as 
al-Mujahid ul-Akbar (the great warrior). 39  Moreover, Bourguiba relied on Islamic 
institutions and symbols to mobilize the masses in the anticolonial jihad.  For instance, 
his party held meetings in mosques and zawiyas (Sufi meeting places), and urged the 
public to pray five times a day for the national martyrs.40 This treatment of Islam is in 
stark contrast with his policy after Tunisian independence in 1956, as the Personal Status 
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Law of 1957 abolished Shari’a courts, banned the hijab, and restricted polygamy. This 
brought into focus Tunisia’s French influences and a secular-nationalist identity over an 
Arab-Islamic identity (see chapter on Islam in the Legal System).41 In other words, 
during the fight for Tunisian independence, Islam was part of the rhetoric against colonial 
powers, but after independence, Islam was typically painted as a symbol of the past; 
westernization was deemed representative of the newly formed country’s future.   
 
Nation-Building and Framing of New Norms  
Advocates for new norms use language that is familiar to the local community 
that “names, interprets, and dramatizes them” to better adapt these new norms to local 
norms. 42 These processes often occur simultaneously and cannot be entirely pulled apart. 
That is, framing may lead to adoption of a new norm, and adoption of a new norm may in 
turn lead to more framing. 
The nation-building process in Muslim countries resulted in a decisive re-
organization of the society-State-religion nexus that was unknown in the pre-modern era. 
Under the Caliphate, Islamic institutions and clerics had not been subordinated to 
political power. Most scholars of political history43 argue that divisions of labor and 
hierarchies of power between temporal and spiritual authorities were fairly well 
established by the tenth century. In the medieval period, there were certainly “official” 
Ulama working on behalf of political rulers and providing religious justification for their 
policies, which is similar to the modern period. However, the major difference with the 
                                                
41	  John	  Esposito,	  Islamic	  Threat:	  Myth	  or	  Reality?,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  	   
42	  Amitav	  Acharya,	  “How	  Ideas	  Spread:	  Whose	  Norms	  Matter?	  Norm	  Localization	  and	  Institutional	  Change	  
in	  Asian	  Regionalism,”	  International	  Organization,	  58	  (2004):	  243.	   
43	  See	  Hamid	  Enayat,	  Modern	  Islamic	  Political	  Thought,	  New	  York,	  I.B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd.,	  2005.	  And	  Ira	  M.	  
Lapidus,	  A	  History	  of	  Islamic	  Societies,	  Second	  Ed.,	  Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002.	   
modern time is that religious authorities and institutions were financially and 
organizationally independent from the political power.  
The Caliphs also acknowledged the cultural and religious diversity of society, 
although it did not translate into an egalitarian legal and political status for all religions 
and ethnicities. The Ummah was defined as the sum of the territories and populations 
under the Caliphate rule, hence encompassing an extensive distribution of ethnic, 
cultural, and linguistic groups, including: Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, 
Bahais, and Druzes. Even though the Caliphate represented the example of the original 
community that followed the message of the Prophet Mohammad, in reality its power 
was limited by geography and comparable to that of any secular dynasty ruling multiple 
ethnic and religious groups.44 This tension between the ideal (of a community following 
the model of the Prophet) and the political reality was apparent in the distinction between 
Shari’a and Syar forged by the juris consultes. Shari’a referred to the laws that apply to 
Muslims, while Syar designed the laws that apply to non-Muslims living under Caliphate 
rule, or to the relations between the Caliphate and the non-Muslims at the international 
level.45 In contrast, the modern vision of the Ummah is removed from this imperial 
definition; the consensus among Muslim scholars is that the Ummah refers to a spiritual, 
non-territorial community distinguished by the shared beliefs of its members. The 
Ummah is therefore often seen as a type of citizenship that all Muslims have independent 
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   Arab	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of territory. 46  Contemporary theologian, Yusuf al Qaradawi, in the context of the 
Palestinian national movement, illustrates this more contemporary and predominant 
vision of the Ummah as a transnational alliance of Muslims that excludes non-Muslims: 
"Supporting the Palestinian people in Gaza is a religious duty on every Muslim individual 
[from Morocco to Indonesia] according to his capabilities, and no one is exempted from 
that duty.” 47 
As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the emergence of the State as the central 
political institution went hand in hand with the homogenization of the different national 
communities. That is, nation-building systematically omitted and sometimes eradicated 
particular ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in order to create one nation defined by 
one religion and one language. This homogenization process also led to a politicized 
narrative of religion, i.e. political Islam. In this regard, Muslim countries are not 
exceptional; with the advent of the modern Nation-State, the rules of engagement 
between religion and politics have been redefined everywhere. However, this does mean 
that contrary to the dominant liberal narrative, religion has not become politically 
irrelevant.48 
At the same time, the architects of the new Nation-States outside of the western 
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world had to determine to what degree the “core” collective identity of the country should 
be sacrificed in exchange for the western institutions and technologies necessary to 
strengthen the State both militarily and economically.49 Each State that faced this 
dilemma has responded differently. In the case of Nations built on the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, the diffusion of international norms of Statehood was decisive in the 
fabrication of Islam as a political religion. The emergence of new political norms tied to 
nationalism generally resulted in State narratives that either referenced Islamic 
terminology or were diversely articulated within an Islamic framework. Localization of 
these norms occurred as State actors employed strategies of entrepreneurship and 
reframed it using local vocabulary.50 As noted above, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Arabism contributed to the broad appeal of nationalist discourse.51 In other words, 
Islamic references and norms were used to “localize” the nation-building process and 
legitimize State actors and policies. The outcome of such localization was the redefinition 
of Islam within the new State institutions.  
The adoption of outside norms into local contexts also involved both grafting and 
pruning, two tactics often employed by local actors to institutionalize external norms by 
associating them with preexisting ones. Here, linkages have to be constructed and 
carefully articulated by proponents of new norms, because the links are not always 
intuitive or seemingly natural. In Muslim countries, pruning and grafting have primarily 
taken place through three mechanisms: references to Islam in the Constitution, 
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nationalization of Islamic institutions, and the incorporation of Islam in the legal system. 
In sum, the localization phase has entailed the marshaling of four domains to appropriate 
Islam as a tool for the elaboration of the Nation-State. These domains include: 
1) The Constitutional inscription of Islam 
2) The nationalization of Islamic institutions and clerics 
3) Islam in the legal system  




2) Political Islam as political culture 
With the creation of a State education system, the curricula and textbooks of 
public education have socialized new generations to the idea that national identity and 
Islamic identity are two sides of the same coin. By inscribing Islam within the public 
education system, the State posits itself as the protector of the Islamic heritage, and 
assumes “the responsibility to provide children and youths with trustworthy religious 
guidance.” 52  
National unity comes from two sources: the first is the cultivation of national 
brotherhood (internal cohesion) against outsiders, including external and internal threats 
and enemies, and regardless of sectarian divisions. Because nationalism is about 
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difference, “the imagined community cannot be all-inclusive.”53 As a result, the second 
source is the exclusivist discourses of nationalism, which have implications for 
citizenship, access to political power, and the allocation of resources.54 This means that 
the State excludes those who do not belong to the dominant group within its discursive 
project of establishing ideological hegemony and constructing the national identity 
through education.  
But the underlying and more pervasive source of exclusion is the use of Islam 
within the education system to homogenize the nation. Despite more recent initiatives to 
focus on tolerance in the curricula, religious minorities are still neglected and 
discriminated within most of the curricula of public education. Also, because the concept 
of tolerance is only promoted in the religious context, other parts of the curricula 
(history/social studies) that are also influenced by Islamic terms such as jihad remain 
within a militant context and continue to instill ideas of Islamic supremacy and uniting 
against “infidels”.  
In this regard, it is important to note that Islamic references are not limited to 
religious education, but are also incorporated throughout the entire public school 
curriculum. They permeate history, social studies, civics textbooks, and even appear in 
mathematics.55 Such a “functionalization of religion,” as Gregory Starrett terms it,56 
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apparent	  in	  the	  provided	  examples	  and	  explanations	  based	  on	  Islamic	  law	  and	  traditions.	  For	  example,	  a	  
typical	  mathematics	   exercise	  deals	  with	   the	   issue	  of	   inheritance	   and	  distribution	  of	   an	  eState.	   In	   these	  
problems,	  the	  widow	  is	  given	  an	  eighth	  of	  the	  eState	  and	  the	  sons	  and	  daughters	  receive	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
eState	  with	  the	  sons	  receiving	  twice	  the	  shares	  as	  the	  daughters.	  The	  final	  piece	  of	  information	  becomes	  
learned	   and	   assumed	   knowledge	   for	   other	   exercises	   thereafter.	   (Holger	   Daun	   and	   Geoffrey	   Walford	  
illustrates the socialization process at work, where the State exerts social control and 
assumes the moral authority by promoting a “proper Islamic identity”, and by extension, 
cultivation of “good social behavior” (âdâb ijtimâ’îya) of “good” citizens. For example, 
in primary school Egyptian textbooks, the school is portrayed as the source of the 
child’s moral learnings, which the child will then share with his/her family. 57 Thus, 
while Egyptian textbooks focus on responsibility and duty as main Muslim values,58 
these are virtues taught by the schools (and thus, by the State), not by independent 
groups. Similarly in Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was created under the 
office of the prime minister, and its responsibilities include administering Islamic affairs 
with the objective “to create ‘good citizens’ with civic responsibility toward the State.”59 
In this way, the Turkish State has tried to control Islam and through public education, 
disseminated Islam towards its own nationalizing and secularizing goals.  
 We collected and analyzed primary and secondary school textbooks from Iraq, 
Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia and Pakistan used over the period of 2000-2003. The textbooks 
we focused on were Islamic education textbooks (reflected in a variety of names: 
“Islamic Insight”, “Religious Studies”, “Islamic Culture and Religious Studies”, etc.) and 
history and “National and Civic Education” textbooks. We performed a content analysis 
to discover the association between Islamic religious terms (jihad, ummah) and political 
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terms (nation, state, citizen); the connotations linked to other religions; and the 
conception of the West.  
 
A) Ummah Vs. Nation  
 References to the Ummah in textbooks show that the legitimization of the national 
community builds on the concept of the Ummah. As a result, however, such a reference 
complicates issues of citizenship and national identity because while religious identity 
bolsters national unity, it also undermines national distinctiveness because of the sense of 
allegiance to the larger Islamic community. Naureen Durrani and Mairead Dunne sum the 
topic up capably: “religious identity transcends national boundaries but national identity 
requires identification with a particular geographical place.”60 The idea of Islam as 
central to one’s identity places priority on the Ummah over the nation, and as a result, the 
State grants symbolic supremacy to the Ummah in terms of religious solidarity. 
Especially in the case of public education in Pakistan, identification with the Ummah and 
Pakistan are used interchangeably.  
In the case of Egypt, religious educational texts have gone through two phases: 
the Pan-Arabist focus under Nasser and Sadat, and the nationalist/Egypt-first emphasis 
under Mubarak. The first phase under Sadat illustrates the political instrumentalization of 
the Ummah under nation-State regimes while also asserting the primacy of the Egyptian 
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“The	  fourth	  aspect	  of	  national	   identity	   is	  that	   it	  connects	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  group	  of	  people	  to	  a	  particular	  geographical	  
place…ethnic	  or	   religious	   identities	  often	  have	   sacred	   sites	  or	  places	  of	  origin,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  an	  essential	  
part	  of	  having	   the	   identity	   that	   you	   should	  permanently	  occupy	   that	  place…A	  nation,	   in	   contrast,	  must	  
have	  a	  homeland.”	  
From	  –	  1995:	  David	  Miller.	  On	  Nationality,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  24.	   
identity. As shown by Olivier Carre, 72 percent of the content of religious education was 
devoted to political and social matters.61 The texts showed that the Ummah is superior to 
the Arab nation and to the country of Egypt; however, the Arab nation and culture should 
work for the good of the Muslim Ummah, as Arab unity is regarded as an essential article 
of the Islamic faith. One text quoted in Carre gives this invocation: “O God!  Bring to us 
unity!  O God!  Re-unite the Arabs in one nation. When that happens […] they will form 
the most powerful, the richest, the most knowledgeable and the most important of 
nations!”62 The Muslim Ummah and the Arab nation inter-mesh and reinforce each other. 
Carre concludes, “The texts call young Egyptians to feel and think of themselves as 
Arabs above all and to apply to their Arabism and their sense of identity with the Muslim 
Ummah.” Moreover, while the textbooks emphasized Arab socialism, Saeed points out 
that the books and curricula of the Nasser period were marked by a façade of secularism, 
but are in fact very much influenced by fundamentalist Islamic beliefs.63  
In the second phase, the national identity takes precedence. Even religious 
textbooks focus on allegiance to Egypt as the watan or homeland, and in the 2002/2003 
textbooks, there is almost no reference to Arabism or the Islamic Ummah. For instance, 
the first-year primary textbook tells a tale of how Allah saved the watan or homeland of 
the Meccans from the “Ashab al-Feel” (the People of the Elephant) and concludes with a 
poem that goes, “And you, Muslim student, have to love your homeland (watan) / And 
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defend it if it is attacked by any aggressor/ Because you live in it and eat from its food / 
And drink from the water of its blessed Nile.” The focus on the iconic Nile River clearly 
promotes the national identity, which is in direct contrast to the first phase when 
education revolved around the central idea of Arab nationalism in order to reinforce the 
Arab identity over the Egyptian identity.   
Because the modern State has politicized Islam by conflating national identity 
with religious identity, the supremacy of the Ummah is tempered by the textbooks’ 
promotion of allegiance to the State and the State’s version of Islam. At the same time, 
there is still a tension between the Ummah and the nation in national identity formation in 
the varying levels of reference to the Ummah among the different countries’ curricula. 
Even when the textbooks depict the Ummah as the point of reference, it is important to 
note that they also propagate each particular State’s version of Islam as the true Islam of 
the Ummah. Moreover, the tension between the Ummah and the nation is simultaneously 
manipulated and manifested by many Islamists’ rivaling political agendas to the State and 
the competing nationalist (modernist) and Islamist (traditionalist) approaches to 
education.64 Islamists believe and criticize that ‘Islamic education’ has been confined to a 
separate subject instead of rightfully defining the outlook of the entire educational 
system.  
Thus, each State propagates a unique representation of the Muslim identity 
tailored to forge the national identity, promote national unity and cement State authority. 
Furthermore, each country’s curriculum reflects local histories, the degree of Islamist 
clout in the educational policy as well as the specific policy interests of the State. 
However, the textbook representations of Muslim identity do share four common 
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characterizations of Islam, which further promote unity and reinforce State authority: (a) 
blurring of sectarian divisions to promote a singular and unified Islam; (b) fostering 
national “uniqueness” through a master narrative of victimization to inculcate a sense of 
unity against oppressors and representations of conflict, which often includes discussion 
of jihad; (c) building this uniqueness on the implicitly or explicitly proclaimed 
superiority of Islam; and relatedly, (d) misrepresenting or omitting Christians and Jews.  
 
B)  Islam as Singular and Monolithic 
No country is religiously homogenous, but textbooks in Muslim-majority countries 
essentialize Islam as a monolithic religion and deny through omission, the existence of 
Islamic sects. Since Christian minorities are often acknowledged by State laws, Christian 
students are exempted from Islamic education or are sometimes offered alternative 
Christian education. However, Islamic sectarian minorities are not exempted from 
Islamic education class, which teaches a tradition that is not their own. Although each 
country’s curricula espouses a different version of Islam, they all avoid sectarian 
distinctions by simultaneously promoting a singular representation of Islam and 
scrupulously not mentioning any Islamic sect by name. As a result, Islamic references are 
used to forge a fictitious and homogenous community within the State and in the Ummah. 
In all countries studied, religious education is compulsory, and for adherents of all 
Islamic sects, the Sunni tradition of the dominant group is taught as the sole version of 
Islam.  
 Perhaps most interesting is the case of Turkey, which as a “secular” State 
promotes Islam as primarily Turkish, “existing in a vacuum apart from its Middle Eastern 
context, oblivious to existing sectarian or minority differences, and serving as a locus of 
identity for feelings of Turkish nationalism.”65 Hakan Yavuz terms this Turkification of 
Islam as “internal secularization” because the State imagines and promotes this vision of 
Islam in terms of modern concepts like nationalism. 66  On the flipside, Islamic 
intellectuals and movements engage in the “vernacularization of modernity,” which 
means redefining the discourses of modernity (such as nationalism and secularism) in 
their own Islamic terms.67 Thus, the contradiction of a secular State and compulsory 
religious education is reconciled by the fact that “Islamic knowledge is reformulated and 
presented in a way that functionalizes Islam, equating religious study with any other 
subject.”68 Religious instruction is advertised as necessary and obligatory because Islamic 
values are practical and useful to society. Moreover, religion acts as divine legitimization 
“for the pillars of the official ideology of the ‘secular’ State’.”69  
According to Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, “Education and instruction in 
religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in 
religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and 
secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the 
individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal 
representatives.”70 While the last part of Article 24 is an important caveat, it is clear that 
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it is not upheld especially towards Alevi students who are required to attend lessons in 
Religious Culture and Ethics promoting Sunni Islam.71 Thus, the teaching of religion 
allows the State to further its vision of a Turkish-Sunni society by using the compulsory 
religious education classes to teach Islam as a Turkish religion reflecting the Sunni 
Islamic interpretation. As a result, the textbooks emphasize the conflation of Turkishness 
and Islam by including pictures of mosques and holy shrines in Turkey and presenting all 
Muslim scholars as Turkish, while cutting off Islamic history after the Turks accepted 
Islam.72 In addition to inculcating the idea of Turkish Islam, textbooks do not mention 
sectarian divisions within Islam or religious minorities of Turkey, implying that there is 
no alternative to the Turkish-Sunni identity.    
Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq all constitutionally declare Islam as the State 
religion, but the teaching of Islam in each country varies according to the social and 
religious features of the society as well as of the political orientation of the regime.  As 
further detailed below:  in Pakistan, a “ritualistic” approach of Islam is propagated using 
“religious symbolism to counter economic discontent, political dissent, and ethnic 
nationalism.”73 In Tunisia and Egypt under authoritarian rulers, the compulsory religious 
education was aimed to discredit Islamists within their own societies. During Saddam’s 
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regime in Iraq, textbooks emphasized homogeneity and denied the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian 
divide in order to impose unity on Iraqi society.  
 
The official curriculum of the Pakistani State equates Islam with the national 
identity by teaching that Muslim identity and Pakistani identity are synonymous, thus 
ignoring religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity.74 As a result, students defined 
‘being Pakistani’ as ‘being Muslim,’ which meant their complete adherence to Islamic 
rituals, as a result of their education emphasizing religious symbols and rituals such as 
“namaz, recitation of the Qu’ran, etc.75 In this way, the State is able to promote national 
unity through the concept of Islamic unity despite its multi-ethnic and linguistic nature.76 
Especially, after the secession and creation of Bangladesh in 1974, ethnic diversity was 
targeted as the biggest threat to national unity and sovereignty. In these conditions, the 
“ritualistic” version of Islam serves as the unifying ideology to downplay and 
domesticate sectarian, ethnic, and provincial sentiments, which in turn promotes 
homogeneity, solidarity and unity through Islam.  
While Pakistani education does not favor the Sunni or Shi’a tradition, the 
curriculum teaches that there is a distinction between “good” and “bad” Muslims, and by 
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extension “good” and “bad” Pakistanis.77 The “good” Muslims are those who are pious or 
those who follow Islamic rituals and customs, while the “bad” Muslims are those who 
follow “un-Islamic customs”. As a result, no acknowledgement or recognition of multiple 
ways of being Muslim is possible. For example, Muslims students must declare in writing 
that they believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the final Prophet, with no exemption for 
Ahmadis do not share such a belief.78 
 
While both Islam and Christianity are taught in Egyptian public schools, parents 
cannot choose the religion their children are taught at school.  According to Article 19 of 
Egypt’s constitution: “Religious education shall be a principal subject in the courses of 
general education.” If one of the parents is Muslim, the child is considered Muslim and 
will be placed accordingly. The tradition of Islam taught at schools is Sunni Islam, 
without distinction between the different schools or any mention of Shi’ism.79 According 
to Toronto and Eissa’s study on Islamic education in Egypt, “the curriculum, from 
beginning to end, leaves Muslim students with the impression that Sunni Islam is the only 
and correct version of Islam in existence.”80 Such a teaching contradicts the reality that 
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Egyptian students live in. Although there aren’t many Shi’ites in Egypt, there are several 
mosque-shrines dedicated to Shi’ite figures that are visited and celebrated by Sunni and 
Shi’ite alike. Additionally, the lack of information on Sufism in public religious 
education is in stark contrast to the Sufi influence and presence at all levels of Egyptian 
society.81 Nowhere are sectarian identities discussed lest they induce fragmentation and 
subsequent instability of the national identity, and instead, the majority Sunni Islamic 
tradition is offered as “the” Egyptian norm. 
The educational system was one of the main arenas of tension and competition 
between the State and the Islamists.82 Thus, while the Egyptian State’s education focuses 
on national identity over the idea of belonging to the greater Ummah, the Islamists argue, 
the focus in Islamic education should not be to reinforce national identity but rather to 
uphold the nation-transcending Muslim community (Ummah). 83  However, school 
textbooks in Egypt maintain the State’s religious legitimacy because they reflect 
adherence to traditional methods of education: memorization and oral recitation, and 
source materials such as the Qu’ran, Hadith, biographies of prominent Muslims, and 
Shari’a. Additionally, the objectives of the curricula include teaching the proper 
recitation of the Qu’ran, rituals, and correct Islamic dress and behavior.  
Despite this traditionalist approach, the main purpose of the curricula is not to 
teach the Islamic tradition but to provide religious legitimacy to the State policies.  For 
example, at some specific political periods, textbooks were directed toward fighting and 
discrediting extremist Islamist groups in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the 
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people. Hence, public education in Egypt aims to construct an identity based on the 
preeminence of Sunni Islam as a source of values for a national identity.84 For example, 
textbooks stress the importance of “loving the homeland which God bestowed on us…. 
Our noble religion commands us to develop it, to work for its glory and to defend its land 
and people.”85 In a lesson to first graders about the topic of love, the textbook offers a 
row of illustrations about recommended objects of love; the first being “the flag of my 
country”, followed by the teacher, family, and friends.86  
 
Under Saddam Hussein, a Sunni version of Islam was promoted in Iraqi 
textbooks, despite the fact that the majority of the population is Shia.  It included Sunni 
prayer stances and a certain bias towards the Sunni version of Islamic history. Further, 
most books contained Saddam’s image, and all social studies, civics, history books—as 
well as Islamic history—included substantial content on the history and ideology of the 
Baath party. Students were instructed in the importance of “loyalty to the (Arab) people 
and to the leadership of ‘the Party’ and the revolution.”87 Islam was used consistently in 
support such indoctrination: the party’s history was presented in the context of early 
Islamic history (lessons on the first Muslims were taught alongside that of modern-day 
Iraq), 88 while the party’s ideology was presented within that of Islamic teachings. For 
example, modern Iraqi and Baath party history were taught alongside early Islamic 
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history, with Saddam depicted as their champion. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, for 
instance, was presented in Arab and Islamic history textbooks as a modern version of the 
7th century Arab-Islamic victory over the Persians in the battle of Qaddisiyya: 
The battle of Qaddissiya of our ancestors was repeated by the champion of 
Arabism and Islam, our leader Saddam Hussein (may Allah protect and 
guide him) against the Persian enemy.89   
 
The Saddam curriculum also aimed to indoctrinate students with the belief in a 
homogeneous Iraqi society. Ethnic and cultural diversity was downplayed and little 
mention was made of any distinct groups. On the other hand, proclamations of 
coexistence and cooperation were frequent. Students were told that “Iraqis feel unified; 
they cooperate and are proud of their deep connection to one another.” This so-called 
camaraderie, a common theme especially at the primary level, was taught by way of 
discounting distinct characteristics and maintaining an appearance of an homogenous 
Iraq. The theme in the excerpt below, taken from a seventh grade social studies book is 
echoed throughout the curriculum: 
The people of Iraq are a single firm unit—from the north to the 
south…Living together for thousands of years generated unity between 
(the Iraqi) people. Iraqi blood was fused in its defense.90 
 
 
Despite the proclaimed secularism of Baathist ideology, Islamic references were often 
used to facilitate its legitimation. Quotes from the Qu’ran were interspersed throughout 
lessons highlighting Baath principles.  A lesson instructing students to limit their 
materialistic consumption for the sake of their country and nation (umma) is accompanied 
by the Qu’ranic saying, “Those who squander are the brothers of Satan.” By conserving 
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and avoiding materialism, students were taught, they will “triumph against the greed of 
the American, British, and Zionist enemies.”91  
 
After the United States invaded Iraq and ended Saddam regime in 2003, the new 
Ministry of Education’s General Curriculum Directorate, in partnership with UNESCO 
and USAID, established a committee for curriculum development in order to drastically 
change the nature and content of the religious teaching. The committee was comprised of 
Iraqi educators and education experts chosen by the US, who consulted with other local 
leaders in education, particularly Islamic education92 The massive endeavor to provide 
Iraq’s 16,000 schools with revised study materials began with the removal of all images 
of Saddam Hussein and Baath content from textbooks.  A subsequent step involved the 
introduction of new materials that would promote tolerance, respect, and appreciation for 
a pluralistic Iraqi society by recognizing its religious and ethnic components rather than 
discounting them.  
In a broad sense, the prevalence of abstract concepts of tolerance in the Saddam-
era curriculum was likely a factor in the decision to continue the use of some old 
textbooks, with revisions, in the new curriculum (this is especially the case with regard to 
Islamic studies). A significant shift however, is evident in the new curriculum with regard 
to specific Iraqi social groups, which were conspicuously ignored in the Saddam-era 
textbooks. This shift includes revisions in civics, social studies, and history texts teach 
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students about Iraq’s “ethnic and religious diversity,” 93 mentioning different Iraqi ethnic 
and religious groups by name, such as Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Sabians, and 
Christians.94  While Saddam-era textbooks also mention Christians, they do so only in the 
context of ancient Islamic history and Jesus as a Muslim prophet. Jews, despite having 
been a significant component of Iraqi society for centuries, are mentioned in a limited 
sense in both old and new curricula, in the context of relations with Mohammad in 
ancient Islamic history and with regard to the Zionist movement and Palestine.    
One of the major revisions in Iraqi textbooks has been the recognition of Shi’a 
groups, as opposed to the original textbooks, which contained a Sunni bias. This 
recognition of religious and sectarian diversity, while being a goal in of itself, is also the 
basis for a unified, stable Iraq and has  been out of reach since  the end of the Saddam 
Hussein era. Since 2003, the curriculum has undergone continuous change and several 
revised versions have been printed only to be retracted due to public opposition. Many 
claim that the changes have been politically motivated, and a significant number of 
politicians, along with religious authorities, have been at the center of what has become a 
high profile debate.95 And while most opponents claim that the new texts promote Shi’a 
interpretations of Islam at the expense of Sunni Islam, complaints run the gamut of the 
political and religious spectrum: some feel that Sunnis are being discriminated against, 
while others assert that not enough has been done to rectify Sunni bias against Shias. 96  
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Still others claim that despite years of revisions, the curriculum still closely resembles 
that of the Saddam-era.97 Many also felt that the US was overstepping its boundaries with 
regard to Iraq’s internal affairs, especially in 2003 following reports in 2003 that USAID 
had demanded that religious reference be limited or banned from certain texts.98 Some 
Islamic religious authorities, already wary of US interference, saw the curriculum project 
as an American plan to westernize Iraqi schools. Sheikh Abdul Settar Jabber, who headed 
a leading Sunni religious group at the time, called the curriculum project a US attempt to 
“break Iraqi identity”.99 At the time of this writing, the debate continues and no 
consensus has been reached on the content of the curriculum.100  
One of the most contentious points of the debate has been over the way in which 
prayer is taught at the primary level. Though prayers under Saddam followed Sunni 
doctrine, the instructional images that accompanied them were ambiguous and could not 
be identified with either the Sunni or Shia sects.101  Elements that would distinguish the 
prayer as belonging to either of the two were conspicuously missing—a decision that was 
perhaps made with the regime’s authoritarian aims in mind.102                        
The new curriculum has addressed the imbalance in a number of ways. A revised 
Islamic studies textbook that was in circulation in 2008 depicted both ways of praying. 
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Yet another textbook depicted two brothers, Mohammad and Ahmad, praying according 
to Sunni and Shia guidelines alongside one another.103  While a more inclusive approach 
to Islamic studies was the stated reason for the change, the move backfired and triggered 
a wave accusations that the changes were politically motivated and that the Shiite-led 
government was deliberately “fostering injustice and sectarianism” by differentiating 
between the Sunnis and Shiites.104 Parents and teachers accustomed to instruction under 
the Saddam regime, especially Sunnis, expressed concern that “teaching more than one 
way of praying might confuse children and “lead to discrimination and sectarianism.” 
They said they hoped children would be taught about Islam in a more general way that 
“did not differentiate between sects” since Muslims were “one people with one religion 
and one God.” 105   
Politicians and religious authorities immediately joined the dispute, fueling even 
more the suspicions that changes to the curriculum were politically motivated.106 Sunni 
politicians criticized the Shiite-led Ministry of Education of fomenting sectarianism, and 
Shiite leaders responded in kind. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani stated publicly that he 
supported changes, and that a single curriculum should reflect “all the beautiful colors of 
Iraqi society” rather than being separate for Shias or Sunnis.107 Statements by Internet 
commentators followed that Sistani was “colluding the (US) occupiers” to develop the 
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curriculum, since they “sought sectarian strife” in Iraq.108 And though most complaints 
were lodged by Sunnis who felt they were discriminated against by Shias, the new books 
were also denounced by one of Iraq’s leading Shia clerics, the Grand Ayatollah Bashir al-
Najafi, who said that they fostered sectarianism by imposing one sect’s control over 
another. 
  A Sunni member of parliament and Chairman of the Committee on Education, 
Alaa Makki, also said that the new curriculum could worsen sectarian relations, and that 
it should focus instead on “the shared aspects (of Islam).” 109  Makki accused the 
Education Ministry of distributed the books without his knowledge. The charge was 
vehemently denied by Iraq’s Minister of Education at the time, Islamic Dawa Party 
member Khudayr al-Khuzai. Al-Khuzai (who currently holds the controversial position 
of the country’s third vice-president under Prime Minister al-Maliki) was later accused by 
Internet commentators of facilitating undue Iranian influence in the revision process by 
having the new textbooks published in Iran rather than Iraq. Some secular leaders have 
since criticized the involvement of religious figures. For example, Mithal al-Alusi, a 
former independent Sunni legislator argued against what he claimed was undue Shi’a 
influence, arguing that the curriculum should not be decided by clerics and politicians, 
but by education experts.110 
The lessons were eventually retracted. Those that replaced them were 
redistributed for the first time in 2010-2011, and, ironically, relied on images nearly 
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identical to those used during the Saddam regime that could not be identified with either 
sect. In addition, parents were instructed to teach their children how to pray. In some 
revised lessons, however, both Shia and Sunni prayers accompanied the ambiguous 
images. Still other books included Shia, rather than Sunni versions, with notes to students 
that only “some Muslims” follow the specific tradition depicted. 111 The impasse clearly 
remains unresolved  and in some ways was a prefiguration of the violences between 
Sunni and Shia brought upon Iraq by ISIS. 
 
More generally, this nationalization of Islam at the core of social identities  has also 
refashioned the islamist project from pan-islamist to national, at least until  the rise of 
global movement like Al Quaida.112 As a result, Islamist opposition groups constructed 
political Islam as a national project, as a tool to achieve what they see as social justice, by 
fighting corrupted rulers. 
 
Islamism as a National or Counter-National Project 
 As mentioned above, Islamism was, at the time of its inception at the end of the 
Ottoman Empire, opposed to nationalism, perceived as a Western imported concept. 
However, after the de-colonization process, the nation framework became the "natural" 
political space, instead of “foreign” or Western concepts. Thus, Islamist opposition 
movements gradually used Islam more as an alternative to the secular nationalism 
promoted by State elites, and less as a way to promote a pan-Islamic Caliphate. In this 
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sense, they have increasingly operated within the context of the newly defined national 
political community. 
In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers believed they held the key to the "true" Islam, and 
therefore to the rightful authority, whereas the State policies were impure. Hassan al-
Banna argued that the purest period of Islam was during the "Golden Age" when 
Muhammad and his successors, the Four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, ruled the Ummah.  
Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate political goal was to create an ‘Islamic Order’ 
or al-nizam al-islami, which emphasized a foundation in Shari’a. While al-Banna 
advocated the implementation of Shari’a, the Brotherhood’s program also recognized the 
non-legal aspects of their vision and worked to improve the social, economic, and 
political aspirations of the Egyptian people.  
That is why the Muslim Brothers declared, “Egypt was the logical and historically 
right place for Islam to base itself… Egypt had a unique role to play in Islam’s 
resurgence.”113 Al-Banna illustrates this point in the following argument:  
The Muslim Brothers, true to the faith, plead that the nation be restored to 
Islam. Egypt’s role is unique, for just as Egyptian reform begins with Islam, 
so the regeneration of Islam must begin in Egypt, for the rebirth of 
‘international Islam’, in both its ideal and historical sense, requires first a 
strong ‘Muslim State’ (dawla muslima).114 
 
In sum, it appears that although Hasan al-Banna's project was to build an Islamic 
political system, his vision was not entirely a pan-Islamic one; and it explains why the 
Muslim Brotherhood would operate more and more within the national Egyptian 
framework.  
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 As a result, domestic politics had strong effects in shaping Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology over time. After the death of al-Banna in 1949 and the Free Officers’ coup in 
1952 to remove the monarchy from power, the relationship between the Brotherhood and 
the State changed from one of cooperation to mistrust. At first, the Muslim Brotherhood 
was allowed to continue as an organization under Gamal Abdel Nasser despite the 
abolishment of existing political parties in 1953. However, the MB’s refusal to grant 
legitimacy to a regime that did not implement Shari’a soon led to organized 
demonstrations against the regime. In October 1954, a young member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood allegedly attempted to assassinate President Nasser and the Brotherhood 
was subsequently outlawed. Members were arrested, jailed, and some even received 
death sentences. Such a political change modified the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy to 
directly oppose the State. This event also accounted for the divides in the movement on 
how to approach the nation’s government.  
 In the same vein, the turn towards radicalization, largely caused by the increased 
repression of the State, reinforced the nationalization of the Islamist strategy by focusing 
on the fight against the ruler. Sayyid Qutb's (1906-1966) redefinition of jihad as the fight 
against the unjust ruler was instrumental in such an evolution. In Milestones (1964), Qutb 
argued that the Egyptian society was steeped in jahiliyyah, or ignorance.115 Therefore, 
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Egypt was living under a takfir regime, or a regime that had renounced Islam.116 Qutb 
called for jihad to battle the jahiliyyah of the Nasser regime because to Qutb, the 
Egyptian State was standing in direct opposition to the ideal Islamic political community. 
However, Qutb’s vision led to several schisms within the Muslim Brotherhood, as several 
groups such as the Islamic Jihad, and al-Takfir al-Hijra117 adopted the jihad against the 
unjust ruler strategy as their priority.118    
 Muhammad abd al-Salaam Faraj (1954-1982), the founder of the Islamic Jihad, 
which assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981, went even further in his national jihad 
approach. In his text, The Absent Obligation, Faraj argues that the present Egyptian rulers 
had been “brought up over colonial tables be they Christian, Communist or Zionist. What 
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they carry of Islam is nothing but names, even if they pray, fast and claim to be 
Muslims.”119 Furthermore, Faraj argued that the time to restore the Caliphate of Islam 
was immediate, and it was “obligatory upon every Muslim to do his utmost to implement 
[it].”120 Faraj promoted jihad as a sixth pillar of Islam, meaning that every Muslim was 
obligated to immediately undermine the State and replace it with a Caliphate. This 
conception of jihad became global when some of these radical opponents, including 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, left Egypt to join the jihad in Afghanistan, which led to the 
formation of Al-Qaida in 1998.121 
 In contrast, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood operated under the guidance of 
Hasan al-Hudaybi (1891-1973),122 who in his book du’a la quda (Preachers, Not Judges), 
published after his death, explicitly criticized the takfiri ideology of Qutb.123 Al-Hudaybi 
directly questions Qutb’s idea of jihad, and instead preaches faith, patience, and 
perseverance. He argued that the duty of all Muslims is “to enact all of God’s orders and 
statutes and to pave the way for the establishment of His religion.”124 More specifically, 
under Hudaybi, the Muslim Brothers began to discuss (1) their involvement in Egyptian 
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political life (2) their compromise with the Egyptian State, and (3) the acceptance of 
democratic rules, including women and minorities. 
 
The creation of A Quaida is the most recent evolution of the islamist project and is the  
outcome of the combination of the jihadi guerrilla of Qtib and Faraj and the salafi 
doctrine of Islam from Saudi Arabia. Today, the conditions for communication and the 
circulation of people and ideas make the Ummah all the more effective as a concept, 
especially considering the fact that nationalist ideologies have been on the wane. The 
Imagined Ummah takes a variety of forms. The most influential of these forms are 
fundamentalist in the sense that they place an emphasis on the revealed Text. The Most 
successful globalizations are  the wahabism/salafism and global Jihad movements. 
  
What all of these movements indicate is the emergence of fundamentalism as a 
global phenomenon. Global fundamentalism is defined, above all, by an exclusive and 
hierarchical vision of the world, as well as by a taxonomy of religions that places Islam at 
the top. The expanded use of the term ‘kafir’ (infidel, heretic), for example, is very 
common among Wahhabis (more than among Tablighis). In the classical Islamic 
tradition, this term is used only for polytheists, not for members of competing 
monotheistic faiths. In globalized fundamentalist groups, however, it has been extended 
to include Jews, Christians, and sometimes even non-practicing Muslims (see Cesari, 
2004). Thus the world is divided into Muslims and infidels, and the image of the West, 
automatically associated with moral depravity, is always a negative one. Also common to 
these movements is a worldview that separates the various aspects of life —family, work, 
leisure—and classifies everything according to the opposition between haram (forbidden) 
and halal (permitted). Everything that did not already exist or happen during the time of 
the Prophet is an innovation, thus haram. All share the vision of homogenous, superior 
Islam now denationalized and globalized to the Ummah. 
   
 
 
Conclusion: Modern Islam is Political Islam 
 
The outcome of the homogenization process described above is a politicized narrative of 
religion, or political Islam. Under these conditions, the dominant Western narrative of 
modernization cannot help explain this process because it contains an inherent 
assumption that secularization leads to the decline of religion in the political sphere. The 
invention of Islam as a modern religion is closely associated with the building of the 
Nation-State. The efforts by these “secular” States to limit the social influence of religion 
actually led to a nationalization of religious identities and therefore, to their politicization, 
defying the expectations of earlier modernization theories.125 
From the time of nation-building, Islam has been acknowledged in most 
constitutions and has often been inscribed into the constitutional foundations as the 
religion of the country. Thus, it is recognized as the religion of the State, and such 
recognition occurred even when the State founders maintained a very secular orientation. 
What followed, as explained in the previous chapters, are the nationalization of Islamic 
institutions, State-ordained religious education in public schools, and the enduring 
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legacies of Shari’a law in the legal system. As a result, the political development of 
Muslim Nation-States leads to a more complex approach to secularity than the separation 
of Church and State principle.  
In this regard, political and social modernization in Muslim countries stands in 
stark opposition to the dominant Western narrative according to which, the religious 
identity of the individual departed from national identity and became increasingly 
privatized with the expansion of political and civic rights (even though this story does not 
reflect the diversity and nuances of such historical processes that took place in European 
and American nations, as we shall argue in the conclusion of this book). In other words, 
there is often a correlation of national and religious identities in present day Muslim 
countries. As a result of this fusion, a moral hierarchy is established, in which the 
national government intervenes in the personal lives of its citizens on topics that range 
from dress, social relations even to culture. 
Charles Taylor has superbly demonstrated 126  that Western secularity is the 
culmination of a historical progression of ideas about religion, such that “authentic” 
religiosity became increasingly associated with personal commitment and a conception of 
the world as immanent. The separation of the “worldly” from the “transcendent”, led to 
the private vs. public disjunction.  This separation was accelerated through the 
Reformation and laid the groundwork for the ascendance of a neutral, self-sufficient 
secular order, leading to the contemporary situation where belief in God is considered to 
be one among many viable spiritual options. An environment where private and public 
are separated in this way does not necessarily prevent believers from enjoying the right to 
full expression of their religious identity, although they can occasionally face challenges 
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in this regard that non-believers do not. For instance, The Satanic Verses or Danish 
cartoons crisis are signs that some Muslims who live in Western secular democracies are 
struggling with this framework of the immanent at the personal level.127  
 
In contrast, modern religion in Muslim countries is positioned on the platform of 
the State with the consequence that the latter has defined modern Islam as a code of 
public morality. In all of the countries surveyed, a combination of culturally constructed 
values (adab) and Islamic Law create social customs, which emphasize the social over 
the individual being. In other words, daily interactions reinforce the idea that the self is 
subdued to social obligations. This standard extends to the  very definition of equality. 
Whereas in the West equality is defined by uniform sets of individual rights, in the 
countries studied, equality is the equal obligation of individuals to promote communal 
welfare. Hence, the moral obligation of the family allows no room for the “promotion of 
self” above the interests of the community. Any conceptions of female emancipation, 
therefore, are regarded as dissonant with the cultural values of the nation often defined in 
religious terms. A case in point is the controversy created by Prime Minister Erdogan in 
May 2012, when Mr. Erdogan told a gathering of the women's branches of his Justice and 
Development party that "each abortion is one Uludere" – a reference to air strikes on a 
village on the Iraqi border that killed 34 civilians in December. Abortions, said the PM, 
were, "a sneaky plan to wipe the country off the world stage".128 The same rhetoric is also 
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present in western democracies as shown by the political agenda of Christian 
fundamentalist groups in the United States. But these claims do not operate (until now) 
within the same legal and political environment. 
Generally speaking, gendered roles in the family reflect a hierarchy of social 
positions and purposes that directly impact on women’s lives in both the private and 
public spheres. For example, at the core of the nationalist ideology of the countries 
surveyed, there is an element of self-preservation, in order to secure moral capital in a 
rapidly Westernizing world. Globalization and consumerism both pose threats to the 
social composition of these respective regions of the Muslim world, which, in their 
instability, regard this trend as one of moral depravity. This globalizing cultural setting, 
in which the terms and values of social relations are mutating, the reflex in most Muslim 
countries is to subordinate the rights of individuals, frequently women, in favor of the 
general social cohesion and political welfare. Government officials, therefore, have relied 
upon the pre-established moral capital of religion and familial structure to control the 
social upheaval stirred by Western influences. Consequentially, women’s behavior and 
sexuality often become restricted. 
Presently, the control of women’s bodies and sexuality has guaranteed both 
continuity and stability in the public sphere. Securing a gendered moral hierarchy in the 
private sphere likewise safeguards social harmony and political stability. Religious and 
political leaders alike reinforce this presumption of the women’s role in family and 
society. The result is continuous tensions over the legitimate definition of women rights, 
opposing the advocates of the empowerment of self  to the protectors of the political 
community defined in Islamic terms.  
 
It is important to note that the body is a topic through which many Islamic 
religious authorities and institutions have critiqued postmodern society.129 In this light, 
Islam serves as a countercultural voice that simultaneously rebukes Western cultural 
hegemony and serves the respective political interests of Islamic religious authorities. In 
other words, Islam is conveniently used by both politicians and religious authorities in 
Middle Eastern countries to critique Western and secular values with the woman’s body 
being the major site of this cultural and political tension between: the West and Islam; 
past and present; and individual versus collective rights. 
At the same time, religious norms and references cannot be completely controlled 
by the States, especially at a time of facilitated global communication and expedited 
circulation of ideas that increase the debate on Islamic orthodoxy. In other words, state 
policies are increasingly challenged by transnational ideas and agents   who are currently  
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